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Abstract
We propose a collective opinion formation model with a so-called confirmation bias. The confir-
mation bias is a psychological effect with which, in the context of opinion formation, an individual
in favor of an opinion is prone to misperceive new incoming information as supporting the current
belief of the individual. Our model modifies a Bayesian decision-making model for single individu-
als [M. Rabin and J. L. Schrag, Q. J. Econ. 114, 37 (1999)] for the case of a well-mixed population
of interacting individuals in the absence of the external input. We numerically simulate the model
to show that all the agents eventually agree on one of the two opinions only when the confirma-
tion bias is weak. Otherwise, the stochastic population dynamics ends up creating a disagreement
configuration (also called polarization), particularly for large system sizes. A strong confirmation
bias allows various final disagreement configurations with different fractions of the individuals in
favor of the opposite opinions.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Ey, 02.50.Le
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are various models of collective opinion formation in which agents modify their
opinions according to interaction with other agents [1, 2]. Opinion formation is a dynamic
process: for example, interaction between agents makes their opinions approach each other.
An important problem in opinion dynamics is to examine when an agreement (i.e., consensus)
among all the agents occurs. Complete agreement is rarely observed in the real world [3, 4].
However, it is an established fact that opinion dynamics under the voter model, a classical
opinion model in statistical physics and probability theory, inevitably reaches agreement
in finite populations [1, 5–9]. The majority rule model has a similar feature [1, 10, 11].
Partly motivated by this discrepancy, various extensions of voter and majority rule models
and different models of collective opinion formation have been proposed to account for the
disagreement in finite populations. Examples include the Deffuant model [12], language
competition models [13–20], voter-like models on adaptive networks [21–24], voter model
under partisan bias (the assumption that agents naturally prefer one opinion) [25, 26], and
variations of Axelrod’s cultural dynamics (see [1] for references). Theoretical models have
also been proposed in social sciences to explain disagreement in the context of polarization.
For example, prior beliefs or initially received signals can cause disagreement between agents,
even if they receive the same public signals from then on [27–31].
Although there is a plethora of studies addressing the problem of agreement and disagree-
ment in opinion dynamics, we propose a model incorporating two factors that are relevant to
human behavior: Bayesian belief updating and confirmation bias. Bayesian belief updating
is commonly used in studies of the decision making of agents receiving uncertain information
[30, 32, 33]. The confirmation bias is a psychological bias inherent in humans, in which an
agent inclined towards an opinion tends to misperceive incoming signals as supporting the
agent’s belief [34, 35]. A non-Bayesian model with the confirmation bias was previously
proposed for explaining the influences of media and interactions between agents [36].
We are not the first to study opinion formation under the Bayesian updating and confir-
mation bias. In the framework of single agent opinion formation, Rabin and Schrag showed
that the confirmation bias triggers overconfidence and can cause the individual to hold in-
correct beliefs, even if it receives a series of external signals suggesting the true state of the
world [37]. Orle´an studied the Bayesian dynamics of agents subjected to the confirmation
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bias, interacting through the mean field [38]. The model yields agreement or disagreement
depending on the parameter values.
In this study, motivated by the Rabin-Schrag model [37], we propose a model of collec-
tive opinion formation with a confirmation bias. We model direct peer-to-peer interactions
between agents (not through the mean field) and their effects on the Bayesian updating
of each agent. To study the pure effects of interactions among agents, we do not assume
that agents receive signals from the environment as in previous studies [31]. We numerically
simulate the model to reveal the conditions under which the populations of agents agree and
disagree, depending on the values of parameters such as the strength of the confirmation
bias, fidelity of the signal, and the system size.
II. MODEL
Our model modifies the Bayesian decision-making model proposed by Rabin and Schrag
[37] in two main ways. First, we consider a well-mixed population of Bayesian agents that
interact with each other; Rabin and Schrag focused on the case of the single agent. Second,
agents do not receive external signals from the environment in our model. In the Rabin-
Schrag model, such an external signal, which represents the “correct” answer in the binary
choice situation (i.e., the true state of nature), is assumed. By making the two changes,
we concentrate on collective opinion formation by Bayesian agents, whereby there are two
possible alternative opinions of equal attractiveness.
We label the N agents 1, . . . , N and denote the opinion of agent i (i = 1, . . . , N) by
xi ∈ {A,B}, where A and B are the alternative opinions. We assume that agents are
not perfectly confident in their opinions. To model this factor, we adopt the Bayesian
formalism used by Rabin and Schrag [37]. We denote by Pr(xi = A) the strength of the
belief (hereafter, simply the belief) with which agent i believes in opinion A. A parallel
definition is applied to Pr(xi = B). It should be noted that Pr(xi = A) ≥ 0, Pr(xi = B) ≥ 0,
and Pr(xi = A) + Pr(xi = B) = 1. If Pr(xi = A) = 1/2, agent i is indifferent to either
opinion.
We update the agent’s belief as follows. The time t starts from t = 0. Upon every
updating of an agent’s belief, we add 1/N to t such that the belief of each agent is updated
once per time unit on average. In an updating event, we select an agent i to be updated with
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equal probability 1/N . Agent i refers to agent j’s opinion for updating i’s belief Pr(xi = A),
where j ( 6= i) is selected with equal probability 1/(N − 1) from the population. Agent j
imparts a signal s ∈ {a, b}, where a and b correspond to j’s opinions A and B, respectively.
We assume that the probabilities that agent j imparts s = a and s = b are given by
Pr(s = a) = Pr(s = a|xj = A)Pr(xj = A) + Pr(s = a|xj = B)Pr(xj = B)
= θPr(xj = A) + (1− θ) Pr(xj = B)
= 1− θ + (2θ − 1) Pr(xj = A) (1)
and
Pr(s = b) = Pr(s = b|xj = A)Pr(xj = A) + Pr(s = b|xj = B)Pr(xj = B)
= (1− θ) Pr(xj = A) + θPr(xj = B)
= θ − (2θ − 1) Pr(xj = A), (2)
respectively, where
θ = Pr(s = a|xj = A) = Pr(s = b|xj = B) (3)
represents the reliability of the signal, and 1/2 ≤ θ < 1. If j is confident in its own
opinion and the transformation from j’s belief [i.e., Pr(xj = A)] to j’s output signal (i.e.,
a or b) is reliable, signals a and b are likely to indicate opinions A and B, respectively. In
the limit θ → 1, Pr(s = a) ≈ Pr(xj = A) and Pr(s = b) ≈ Pr(xj = B). If θ = 1/2,
Pr(s = a) = Pr(s = b) = 1/2 such that s does not convey any information about j’s belief.
We implicitly assume that all the agents share the same value of θ and that they know this
fact when performing the Bayesian update, as described below.
When agent j imparts signal s ∈ {a, b}, agent i is assumed to perceive a subject signal
σ ∈ {α, β}, where α and β correspond to A and B, respectively. The flow of the signal
conversion is depicted in Fig. 1. If agent i is not subject to the confirmation bias, α and β
are equal to a and b, respectively. Otherwise, agent i may misinterpret the signal imparted
by agent j, depending on the prior exposure of agent i to other signals. Following Rabin
and Schrag [37], we define
Pr[σ = α|s = a,Pr(xi = A) ≥ 1/2] = Pr[σ = β|s = b,Pr(xi = A) ≤ 1/2] = 1 (4)
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and
Pr[σ = α|s = b,Pr(xi = A) > 1/2] = Pr[σ = β|s = a,Pr(xi = A) < 1/2] = q, (5)
where q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1) parameterizes the strength of the confirmation bias. Equation (5) states
that an agent preferring opinion A misinterprets an arriving b signal as A (i.e., σ = α) with
probability q. If q = 0, the confirmation bias is absent, and s = a and s = b are always
converted to σ = α and σ = β, respectively. If q = 1, the agent perceives the signal that is
consistent with its current preference [i.e., α if Pr(xi = A) > 1/2 and β if Pr(xi = A) < 1/2],
irrespective of the signal imparted by agent j (i.e., a or b). The other conditional probabilities
can be readily derived from Eqs. (4) and (5). For example, Eq. (4) implies
Pr[σ = β|s = a,Pr(xi = A) > 1/2] = 1− Pr[σ = α|s = a,Pr(xi = A) > 1/2] = 0, (6)
and Eq. (5) implies
Pr[σ = α|s = a,Pr(xi = A) < 1/2] = 1− Pr[σ = β|s = a,Pr(xi = A) < 1/2] = 1− q. (7)
Then, by using the Bayes’ theorem, we update agent i’s belief Pr(xi = A|σ) on the basis
of the old belief Pr(xi = A) [= 1 − Pr(xi = B)] and the perceived signal (i.e., α or β).
The perceived signal may be different from the received signal (i.e., a or b) because of their
confirmation bias [Eqs. (4) and (5)]. We assume that agents are not aware that they may be
subject to the confirmation bias. Agents use the subjective conditional probabilities given
by
Pr(σ = α|s = a) = Pr(σ = β|s = b) = 1 (8)
and
Pr(σ = α|s = b) = Pr(σ = β|s = a) = 0 (9)
to perform the Bayesian update. The posterior belief Pr(xi = A|σ) is given by
Pr(xi = A|σ) =
Pr(σ|xi = A)Pr(xi = A)
Pr(σ|xi = A)Pr(xi = A) + Pr(σ|xi = B)Pr(xi = B)
=
∑
s=a,b Pr(σ|s) Pr(s|xi = A)Pr(xi = A)∑
s=a,bPr(σ|s) Pr(s|xi = A)Pr(xi = A) +
∑
s=a,bPr(σ|s) Pr(s|xi = B)Pr(xi = B)
=


θPr(xi = A)
θPr(xi = A) + (1− θ) Pr(xi = B)
(σ = α),
(1− θ) Pr(xi = A)
(1− θ) Pr(xi = A) + θPr(xi = B)
(σ = β).
(10)
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It should be noted that Pr(xi = B|σ) = 1− Pr(xi = A|σ). Then, we increment the time by
1/N such that each agent is updated once per unit time on average. Iterative application of
Eq. (10) leads to
Pr(xi = A) =
θnαi(1− θ)nβi
θnαi(1− θ)nβi + (1− θ)nαiθnβi
=
{
1 +
(
1− θ
θ
)nαi−nβi}−1
(11)
and
Pr(xi = B) =
(1− θ)nαiθnβi
(1− θ)nαiθnβi + θnαi(1− θ)nβi
=
{
1 +
(
1− θ
θ
)nβi−nαi}−1
, (12)
where nαi (nβi) is the accumulated number of signals σ = α (σ = β) that agent i has
perceived. The state of each agent i is uniquely determined by nαi−nβi, which is consistent
with basic Bayesian theory [37, 39].
III. RESULTS
A. Setup for numerical simulations
Unless otherwise stated, we set 1/2 < θ < 1 and assume a neutral initial condition
Pr(xi = A) = 1/2 (1 ≤ i ≤ N), or, equivalently, nαi = nβi (1 ≤ i ≤ N). The agents exchange
signals and update their beliefs, possibly under a confirmation bias. After a transient, the
agents believe in either opinion with a strong confidence, i.e., Pr(xi = A) ≈ 0 or 1. We
halt a run when |nαi − nβi| ≥ ∆nc is satisfied for all i for the first time, where ∆nc is the
threshold. In other words, a run continues if at least one agent i has the |nαi − nβi| value
smaller than ∆nc.
B. Case without the confirmation bias
We first consider the case without a confirmation bias (i.e., q = 0). We investigate the
dynamics of the mean belief PA(t) ≡
∑N
i=1 Pr(xi = A)/N at time t by drawing a return
map, i.e., PA(t) as a function of PA(t − 1) [10, 40, 41]. The return map for N = 100,
θ = 0.99, and ∆nc = 500 based on 1000 runs is shown in Fig. 2. Because PA(t) > PA(t−1)
when 0.5 < PA(t− 1) < 1 and PA(t) < PA(t− 1) when 0 < PA(t− 1) < 0.5, the dynamics
is in accordance with majority rule behavior. All 1000 runs finished with an agreement of
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opinion A [i.e., Pr(xi = A) ≈ 1 for all i] or opinion B [i.e., Pr(xi = A) ≈ 0 for all i]. Each
case occurred approximately half the time.
C. Case with the confirmation bias
We turn on the confirmation bias to examine the possibility that it induces disagreement
among agents. At least for large q (i.e., q ≈ 1), disagreement is expected to be reached
because the first perceived signal would determine the final belief of each agent and is
equally likely to be α and β for many agents.
In the following numerical simulations, we measured the degree of disagreement, which
we defined as follows. We determined that agreement was reached in a run if the final signs
of nαi − nβi were the same for i = 1, . . . , N . Otherwise, we said that disagreement was
reached. We denoted the fraction of runs that finished with disagreement by Fd.
We set ∆nc = 500 and the number of runs to 1000. In Figs. 3(a) and 3(b), Fd is shown as
a function of q and θ for N = 2 and 100, respectively. First, Fd monotonically increases with
q and decreases with θ for both N = 2 and N = 100. It should be noted that disagreement
occurred in at least one run in the regions right to the solid fractured lines in Fig. 3. Second,
Fd for N = 2 [Fig. 3(a)] is smaller than Fd for N = 100 [Fig. 3(b)] for all the q and θ values.
Therefore, disagreement seems to be a likely outcome of the model for large N , particularly
for large q and small θ. When N = 100, perfect agreement, i.e., Fd = 0, is realized only for
q close to zero. In other words, even a small degree of confirmation bias elicits disagreement
among the agents.
D. Probability flow analysis for N = 2
To obtain analytical insights into the model, we performed an annealed approximation
for N = 2 by averaging out fluctuations of the dynamics for different times and runs. The
configuration of the population is specified by (m1, m2) ≡ (nα1 − nβ1, nα2 − nβ2). The
stochastic dynamics of the model can be mapped to a random walk on the two-dimensional
lattice; a walker is initially located at (m1, m2) = (0, 0) and randomly hops to one of the four
neighboring lattice points in each time step. We defined fR(m1, m2), fL(m1, m2), fU(m1, m2),
and fD(m1, m2) as the probabilities that the walker located at (m1, m2) moves to (m1+1, m2),
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(m1 − 1, m2), (m1, m2 + 1), and (m1, m2 − 1), respectively. The four probabilities are given
by
fR(m1, m2) =


(1− q) Pr(s = a|m2) + q
2
(m1 ≥ 1),
Pr(s = a|m2)
2
(m1 = 0),
(1− q) Pr(s = a|m2)
2
(m1 ≤ −1),
(13)
fL(m1, m2) =
1
2
− fR(m1, m2), (14)
fU(m1, m2) =


(1− q) Pr(s = a|m1) + q
2
(m2 ≥ 1),
Pr(s = a|m1)
2
(m2 = 0),
(1− q) Pr(s = a|m1)
2
(m2 ≤ −1),
(15)
and
fD(m1, m2) =
1
2
− fU(m1, m2), (16)
where
Pr(s = a|mj) = 1− θ + (2θ − 1) Pr(xj = A|mj)
= 1− θ + (2θ − 1)
{
1 +
(
1− θ
θ
)mj}−1
(17)
is the probability that agent j with nαj − nβj = mj imparts signal s = a. fR(m1, m2) and
fU(m1, m2) increase with m1 and m2, and fL(m1, m2) and fD(m1, m2) decrease with m1 and
m2.
In the following, we study the mean dynamics of the random walk driven by the drift
terms. Because the transition probability of the random walk is symmetric with respect
to the lines m1 = m2 and m1 = −m2, we focus on the region given by −m2 ≤ m1 ≤
m2, m2 > 0. We define m1c and m2c, which are not integers in general, as the values
satisfying fU(m1c, m2) = fD(m1c, m2)
∀m2 > 0 and fR(m1, m2c) = fL(m1, m2c)
∀m1 < 0,
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respectively. They are given by
m2c = −m1c
=
ln
[
(2θ − 1)
{
1
2(1− q)
− (1− θ)
}−1
− 1
]−1
ln
θ
1− θ
. (18)
Note that m1c and m2c exist if and only if (2θ − 1) {1/2(1− q)− (1− θ)}
−1 − 1 > 0, i.e.,
q < 1−
1
2θ
. (19)
First, we consider the case q < 1− 1/2θ. We partition the upper quadrant of the lattice
(given by −m2 ≤ m1 ≤ m2, m2 > 0) into five regions: region 1 (0 < m1 ≤ m2), region 2
(m1 = 0, m2 > 0), region 3 (−m2 ≤ m1 < 0, 0 < m2 < m2c), region 4 (m1c < m1 < 0, m2 >
m2c), and region 5 (−m2 ≤ m1 < m1c), as shown in Fig. 4(a). We obtain from the condition
1/2 < θ < 1
fR(m1, m2)− fL(m1, m2) ≥ fU(m1, m2)− fD(m1, m2) > 0 (20)
in region 1,
fR(m1, m2)− fL(m1, m2) > 0, fU(m1, m2)− fD(m1, m2) =
q
2
(21)
in region 2,
fU(m1, m2)− fD(m1, m2) ≥ fL(m1, m2)− fR(m1, m2) > 0 (22)
in region 3,
fR(m1, m2)− fL(m1, m2) > 0, fU(m1, m2)− fD(m1, m2) > 0 (23)
in region 4, and
fR(m1, m2)− fL(m1, m2) ≥ fD(m1, m2)− fU(m1, m2) > 0 (24)
in region 5. The probability flow of the walker after the annealed approximation, i.e.,
(fR(m1, m2)− fL(m1, m2), fU(m1, m2)− fD(m1, m2)) inferred from Eqs. (20)-(24) is shown
schematically in Fig. 4(a). If the walker is in the second quadrant (i.e., regions 3, 4, and
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5) where the two agents disagree with each other, the random walker is likely to eventually
escape and enter the first quadrant (i.e., region 1) where the two agents agree with each other.
In fact, Fig. 5(a), which shows the actual probability flow, indicates that the agreement
necessarily occurs. Therefore, agreement is the expected outcome when q < 1− 1/2θ.
Second, if q > 1−1/2θ, regions 4 and 5 are absent because m1c and m2c diverge. Regions
1 and 2, in which inequalities (20) and (21) are satisfied, respectively, are the same as those
in the case q < 1 − 1/2θ. Region 3, in which inequality (22) is satisfied, is modified to
−m2 ≤ m1 < 0. The probability flows are schematically shown in Fig. 4(b). fL(m1, m2) >
fR(m1, m2) and fU(m1, m2) > fD(m1, m2) are satisfied in region 3. Therefore, once the
walker is deep in the second quadrant, it is likely to move toward m1 → −∞ and m2 →∞,
which implies that two agents finally disagree. The actual probability flow shown in Fig.
5(b) is consistent with this prediction.
The transition line q = 1 − 1/2θ is shown by the dashed line in Fig. 3(a). It accurately
predicts the parameter region in which disagreement can occur, i.e., the region right to the
solid line.
The same transition line is also derived for the Rabin-Schrag model, which is concerned
with a single agent subjected to a confirmation bias [37]. In their model, the agent forms
a belief by repetitively receiving a stochastic signal s ∈ {a, b} from nature, according to
Pr(s = a|x = A) = (s = b|x = B) = θ. Rabin and Schrag calculated the probability
that the agent eventually misunderstands the state of the nature (i.e., A or B), starting
from neutral belief. This probability is equal to zero when q ≤ 1− 1/2θ and positive when
q > 1− 1/2θ (see proposition 4 in [37]). Our results obtained in this section are consistent
with theirs because disagreement in our model roughly corresponds to misunderstanding in
the Rabin-Schrag model.
E. Different disagreement configurations for large N
In general, there are N − 1 disagreement configurations, as distinguished by the number
of agents that finally believe in opinion A, which ranges from 1 to N − 1. To distinguish
different disagreement configurations, we examined the fraction of agents that believed in
the minority opinion at the end of a run. We averaged this fraction over the runs ending
with disagreement. We called this quantity the average size of the minority.
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Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show the average size of the minority for N = 10 and N = 100,
respectively. The black regions indicate the parameter values for which the average size
of the minority is undefined because all 1000 runs end with agreement. When q is small,
the average size of the minority monotonically decreases with q and monotonically increases
with θ for both N = 10 and 100. Therefore, small q and large θ values allow only balanced
disagreement configurations, in which the numbers of the agents believing in the opposite
opinions are close to N/2.
However, the average size of the minority increases when q is large. This is particularly
the case for N = 100 [Fig. 6(b)]. This increase occurs for the following reason. With a
strong confirmation bias, agents end up with an opinion consistent with a small number
of signals perceived in the early stages, and both signals are equally likely to be observed
in the early stages under neutral initial conditions. In the extreme case in which q = 1,
agents reinforce the opinion that is consistent with their first perceived signal. Therefore,
unbalanced disagreement configurations are rarely realized when q is large.
F. Effects of the system size and initial condition
Figures 3 and 6 suggest that the agreement is unlikely to be reached in a large popu-
lation. To examine the effect of the population size, we defined qc as the value of q such
that a threshold number of runs among 104 runs end with agreement. For a given θ value,
we determined qc by the bisection method. The number of agreement runs may not mono-
tonically change in q because the number of runs is finite. Therefore, the bisection method
does not perfectly work in general. However, we corroborated that the following results were
negligibly affected by the lack of monotonicity.
The dependence of qc on N is shown in Fig. 7(a) for three threshold values. For example,
the results for the threshold value 100 (shown by circles) indicate that at least 100 runs
among the 104 runs end up with disagreement when q > qc. We set θ = 0.99 and ∆nc = 500.
To explore the possibility of disagreement in large populations, we set θ close to 1. It should
be noted that Fig. 3 indicates that the probability of disagreement is small for a large θ
value. In Fig. 7(a), qc quickly decreases for N ≤ 10 and gradually decreases for N ≥ 100.
Disagreement often occurs for large N unless q is small. Nevertheless, Fig. 7(a) suggests
that the range of q for which agreement always occurs survives for diverging N .
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In generating Fig. 7(a), we used an initial condition in which all the agents had a neutral
belief [i.e., Pr(xi = A) = 0.5, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ]. To check the effect of the initial condition, we
investigated the dependence of qc on N under two other initial conditions. In the bimodal
initial condition, we initially set nαi − nβi = 100 (1 ≤ i ≤ N/2) and nαi − nβi = −100
(N/2+ 1 ≤ i ≤ N). We assumed that N was even for this initial condition. In the so-called
most unbalanced initial condition, we set nα1−nβ1 = 100 and nαi−nβi = −100 (2 ≤ i ≤ N).
The numerical results for the two initial conditions are shown in Figs. 7(b) and 7(c).
The parameter values θ = 0.99, ∆nc = 500 are the same as those used in Fig. 7(a). The
transition point qc decreases with N more rapidly with the bimodal initial condition [Fig.
7(b)] than with the neutral initial condition [Fig. 7(a)]. This result is intuitive: the bimodal
initial condition paves the way to disagreement. In contrast, qc under the most unbalanced
initial condition is almost constant near 0.5 irrespective of N . Therefore, disagreement is
highly unlikely unless the confirmation bias is strong (i.e., q is greater than 0.5). The results
shown in Fig. 7 suggest that the eventual behavior of the model strongly depends on the
initial condition even after the results are averaged over runs.
IV. DISCUSSION
Our numerical results are summarized as follows. When the confirmation bias is absent
(i.e., q = 0), the opinion dynamics under the Bayesian update rule leads to the complete
agreement among agents. The behavior of the model is similar to majority rule dynamics
(Fig. 2). When the confirmation bias is present, disagreement is a likely outcome, par-
ticularly for a strong confirmation bias (i.e., large q). Disagreement is also more likely for
a lower fidelity of the signal (i.e., θ ≈ 1/2) and a larger system size. The transition line
separating the parameter region in which both agreement and disagreement can occur and
that in which only agreement occurs is approximately given by q = 1 − 1/2θ when N = 2.
This line is identical to the one determined by Rabin and Schrag for their model for a single
agent’s decision making [37]. Finally, the behavior of the model strongly depends on the
initial condition.
Our model and results are different from Orle´an’s [38], although Orle´an’s model employs
multiple agents that perform the Bayesian updates under a confirmation bias. First, the be-
lief of each agent is binary in Orle´an’s model, whereas our model introduces an infinite range
12
of discrete beliefs, as in [37]. Second, interaction between agents is introduced differently in
the two models. In Orle´an’s model, each agent refers to the global fraction of agents believ-
ing in one of the two opinions. In our model, agents refer to other opinions by peer-to-peer
interaction, i.e., by receiving a binary signal that is correlated with the belief of the sender.
Third, the stochastic dynamics of Orle´an’s model is ergotic when the collective opinion does
not reach agreement. The collective opinion obeys a stationary distribution, irrespective
of the initial condition. In contrast, in all our simulations, the stochastic dynamics of our
model was nonergotic, such that the final configuration depended on the initial condition in
a wide parameter region.
In social science studies of polarization, several authors analyzed Bayesian models in
which different agents receiving a series of common signals end up in disagreement. The
proposed mechanisms governing disagreement include different initial beliefs or factors that
affect perception of later incoming signals [27–31], different update rules [28], and ambiguity
aversion [28, 42]. These models and ours are different in three major ways. First, a ground
truth opinion corresponding to the state of nature is assumed in these models but not in ours.
Second, public signals commonly received by different agents are assumed in these models but
not in ours. Third, the agents do not have direct peer-to-peer interaction in these models,
but they do in ours. Models with interacting Bayesian agents, which show disagreement
(reviewed in Ref. [30]), are also different from our model in the first respect. It should be
noted that Zimper and Ludwig discussed confirmation bias with their Bayesian model [28].
However, they derived a confirmation bias from their model, rather than assuming one, such
that their results pertaining to confirmation bias were also distinct from ours.
Extending our model to the case of networks is straightforward. For example, we can
select a recipient of the signal with probability 1/N and then select the sender with equal
probability among the neighbors of the recipient on the network. Another possible update
rule is to select the sender first and then the recipient among the sender’s neighbors. Yet
another possibility is to select a link with equal probability and designate one of the two
agents as sender and the other as recipient. On heterogeneous networks, the results may
depend on the update rule because it is the case in the voter model [7–9, 43]. Extension of the
model to the case of confirmation bias heterogeneity may also be interesting. Neurological
evidence shows that different individuals have different confirmation bias strengths [44]. The
strength of the confirmation bias and the position of the node in a social network may be
13
correlated and affect the dynamics. It is also straightforward to extend the model to the case
of multiple opinion cases. These and other extensions, along with the study of analytically
tractable models that capture the essence of the present study, warrant future work.
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FIG. 1. Schematic of signal conversion. Signals a and α correspond to A. Signals b and β
correspond to B. θ is the reliability of the signal, and q is the strength of the confirmation bias.
15
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
P
 −
A(t )
P
 −
A(t −1)
FIG. 2. Return map of the mean belief. We set N = 100, q = 0, and θ = 0.99. We recorded
the values of (PA(t − 1), PA(t)) for t = 1, 1 + 1/N, 1 + 2/N, . . . for 1000 runs and divided the
recorded pairs into 21 classes. The kth class (k = 1, . . . , 21) was composed of the pairs satisfying
(k − 1)/21 ≤ PA(t − 1) < k/21. We obtained the mean value
〈
PA(t)
〉
k
for the kth class by
averaging PA(t) over all the pairs contained in the kth class. Finally, we plotted
〈
PA(t)
〉
k
against
(k − 0.5)/21 for k = 1, . . . , 21. The diagonal PA(t) = PA(t− 1) is also shown as a guide.
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FIG. 3. Fraction of disagreement Fd. (a) N = 2. (b) N = 100. Solid lines represent the boundary
between Fd = 0 and Fd > 0. The dashed line in (a) represents q = 1 − 1/2θ. The dashed line
is not drawn in (b) because this theoretical estimate is valid only for N = 2. In (a), the two
lines almost overlap each other. The initial belief of each agent was assumed to be neutral [i.e.,
Pr(xi = A) = 0.5, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ].
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FIG. 4. Schematic of the probability flow given by fR(m1,m2) − fL(m1,m2) and fU(m1,m2) −
fD(m1,m2). (a) q < 1 − 1/2θ. (b) q > 1 − 1/2θ. The labels from 1 to 5 correspond to the five
regions.
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FIG. 5. Probability flow of the opinion dynamics when N = 2. Vector (fR(m1,m2) −
fL(m1,m2), fU (m1,m2) − fD(m1,m2)) is shown by an arrow of proportional size at each posi-
tion of the random walker (m1,m2). (a) q = 0.15 and θ = 0.64, which satisfies q < 1 − 1/2θ. (b)
q = 0.4 and θ = 0.64, which satisfies q > 1− 1/2θ. The size of the vectors is manually normalized
for clarity, independently for the two panels.
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FIG. 6. Average size of the minority. (a) N = 10 and (b) N = 100. The initial belief of each
agent is assumed to be neutral [i.e., Pr(xi = A) = 0.5, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ]. The black region represents
the case where all the 1000 runs end with agreement such that the average size of the minority is
undefined.
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FIG. 7. Threshold for the agreement-disagreement transition (qc) as a function of N under the
(a) neutral, (b) bimodal, and (c) most unbalanced initial conditions. We set θ = 0.99.
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